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Abstract 
Mandatory information system (IS) investments occur when government regulations 
require firms to alter their IS.  These investments are additional expenditures added 
onto the initial expenditures of non-mandatory IS investments.  Managers are 
concerned about associated costs and in an attempt to reduce the expenditures, most 
firms refrain from formal planning methods when mandatory investments are imposed 
upon them.  Drawing on Henderson’s and Sifonis’ (1988) IS Planning and Investment 
Model as our theoretical lens, this paper argues that firms should re-consider this 
practice.  It is hypothesised that formal planning methods are beneficial because they 
enable firms to combine mandatory and non-mandatory investments in such a way 
that competitive advantage can be achieved.  
We use a secondary dataset provided by the Australian government to test the 
hypotheses. Results show that only two out of three investigated formal planning 
methods are positively associated with competitive advantage. We conclude that in 
the special case of mandatory investments, formal methods are only beneficial if they 
incorporate information from the entire firm, rather than information from particular 
departments only.  
 
Keywords: Strategic IS Planning, Competitive Advantage, IT Investments, Regula-
tory Compliance. 
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1 Introduction 
In a global economy, firms need to comply with a wide range of national and international 
government regulations that have implications for their information system (IS) (Braganza 
and Franken, 2007; Williams, 1994). For example, firms in various countries have recently 
been affected by new auditing regulations based on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (Marnet, 
2007).  Many firms needed to increase IS security to achieve SOX compliance, for example 
by updating wireless networks to prevent unauthorised access (Sipior and Ward, 2007). 
Because SOX compliance is legally required, related investments are mandatory. It is 
estimated that firms spend up to 15% of their IS budgets on regulatory compliance (Gartner, 
2006). 
Recent surveys show that managers are increasingly concerned about the high costs 
associated with mandatory IS investments (Gartner, 2008a). They expect that these 
investments do not pay off because they are not part of the firm strategy (Strassmann, 1996). 
Firms cannot freely decide if, when, and in which technology they invest (Garcia, 2004); 
rather, such decisions are determined by government regulations which, by nature, are 
composed externally and without special consideration of a firm’s particular situation (Hall 
and Liedka, 2007).  Mandatory investments are therefore more difficult to align with a firm’s 
strategy than other IS investments (Hu et al., 2007; Haworth and Pietron, 2006).  
Misalignments between investment and strategy are particularly problematic for firms that 
pursue a low-cost strategy.  These firms create competitive advantage by producing products 
and services at lower costs than competitors. Throughout industries and countries, many low-
cost firms suffer from shrinking margins (Tallon et al., 2007). IS expenditures that do not lead 
to cost reductions further aggravate the financial situation of these firms.  Low-cost firms 
cannot afford ‘wasting’ money on IS that do not contribute to their strategy (Mata et al., 
1995).  
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In an attempt to reduce efforts for mandatory investments, low-cost firms combine these 
investments with non-mandatory investments (Pula et al., 2003). Despite the importance of 
creating competitive advantage from IS investments that have a mandatory part, IT managers 
are unsure how to respond when confronted with mandatory investment decisions (Gartner, 
2008a), and prior research offers few insights that could assist managers in this situation.  As 
a result, many low-cost firms are unable to combine mandatory investments with their non-
mandatory IS investments in such a way that competitive advantage is achieved (Gartner, 
2006).   
This research addresses the gap by investigating how low-cost firms can achieve competitive 
advantage from IS investments that include a mandatory part.  We argue that strategic IS 
planning (SISP) affects the creation of competitive advantage.  SISP is defined as the process 
of identifying opportunities to use IS investments for strategic purposes and developing action 
plans to implement these opportunities (Newkirk et al., 2003). Two major SISP approaches 
exist: formal SISP and intuitive SISP (Lederer and Salmela, 1996). Formal SISP is based on 
formal planning methods and often involves senior managers (Salmela et al., 2000).  Intuitive 
SISP relies on informal strategic decisions that are based on personal experiences of IT 
managers and IT operational staff (Sambamurthy et al., 1994). Experiences from practice 
show that low-cost firms prefer intuitive SISP (Garcia, 2004) because it consumes fewer 
resources (Newkirk et al., 2003; Segars and Grover, 1998).  Hence, research and practice have 
perceived intuitive SISP more adequate for low-cost firms. In this paper, we challenge this 
argument and propose that formal SISP is more adequate in low-cost firms when mandatory 
investments occur. We expect that formal SISP methods enable low-cost firms to combine 
mandatory and non-mandatory investments in a way that is adequate for their business 
strategy and results in competitive advantage.  
Additionally, this paper investigates how the dominance of regulatory pressure as an 
investment reason affects competitive advantage. The dominance of this investment reason 
varies because some firms combine mandatory investments with major long-planned IS 
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investments (Pula et al., 2003), while others integrate them only with minor investments (Hu 
et al., 2007). If government regulations are a dominant investment reason, IS investments 
contain a large mandatory part. Hence, such investments are strongly affected by externally 
defined timing and technology specifications that make it more difficult to use investments 
for strategic benefits. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the dominance of government 
regulations as an investment reason has a negative impact on competitive advantage, however 
little supporting empirical evidence exists.  
This paper aims to demonstrate that if mandatory IS investments are imposed upon low-cost 
firms, competitive advantage is achieved (1) through reducing the dominance of government 
regulations as an investment reason and (2) through using formal SISP methods. We examine 
a sample of 142 Australian firms that recently experienced mandatory IS investments to test 
our hypotheses. Data was taken from on a secondary dataset provided by the Australian 
Department of Communication, Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA).  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Next, we outline the theoretical 
foundation of this research and develop the hypotheses. After that, the methodology is 
described and results are discussed. Finally, conclusions are presented. 
2 Competitive Advantage from mandatory Information System 
Investments 
2.1 Competitive Strategies 
Strategy is defined as “the determination of the basic long term goals of an enterprise and the 
adoption of actions and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals” 
(Chandler, 1962; p. 13). The long term goal of firms in competitive markets is improving or 
defending their competitive position and gaining advantages over competitors (Barney, 2002; 
p. 7). Much has been written about how firms can develop successful competitive strategies 
and achieve competitive advantage.   
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Prominent approaches on competitive advantage include the Porter’s strategy model (Porter, 
1985), the Miles and Snow typology of firms (Miles and Snow, 1978), the resource based 
view (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991), the dynamic capabilities approach 
(Helfat and Peteraf, 2003), and the core competency theory (Pralahad and Hamel, 1990). 
Porter’s strategy model stands out among these approaches because of its strong focus on the 
activities of a firm.  According to Porter, “the essence of strategy is in the activities” which 
are the key to perform differently than competitors (Porter, 1996; p. 64).  In the information 
age, most activities are facilitated by IS and Porter’s model provides insights into the 
contribution of IS to competitive advantage (Slaughter et al., 2006). Therefore, we build on 
Porter’s strategy model (Porter, 1985). Note that in this research the firm is the unit of 
analysis. 
Porter’s model identifies three major competitive strategies: cost-leadership, differentiation, 
and focus. Firms that follow the cost-leadership strategy concentrate in their activities on 
operating at lower costs than competitors. Due to the cost advantage, firms are able to offer 
products and services at lower prices, thereby attracting more customers and gaining higher 
returns. By contrast, firms that follow the differentiation strategy distinguish themselves by 
certain attributes of their products and services. They select one or more differentiation 
attributes that buyers perceive as important and direct their activities at providing these 
attributes. Differentiation attributes vary in different markets and industries. Examples of 
differentiation attributes include product quality and functional product characteristics. 
Finally, firms that follow the focus strategy concentrate on one particular segment of a 
market. This target segment must have buyers with unusual needs. By optimising activities 
for a target segment, firms seek to outperform competitors in this particular segment (Porter, 
1985). 
Much research has been conducted into the relation between competitive strategy and firm 
performance. Most studies conclude that out of Porter’s three strategies, the cost-leadership 
strategy is least successful and needs to be complemented with other strategies like 
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differentiation to be truly effective (Robinsons and Pearce, 1988; White, 1986).  Firms that 
pursue a cost-leadership strategy tend to engage in activities of standardisation and mass 
production that can easily be imitated.  Further, customers of these firms are price-sensitive 
with low levels of brand loyalty. Cost-leadership firms are therefore permanently threatened 
by new market entrants and price wars (Porter, 1985).   
To secure long-term survival, most firms have moved away from the cost-leadership strategy 
towards a low-cost strategy.  The difference between the two strategies is that the low-cost 
strategy does not aim for absolute cost-leadership. While low costs and prices remain the 
major competitive element in the low-cost strategy, differentiation and niche elements are 
used to gain new customers and increase customer loyalty (Tallon, 2007). For example, most 
low-cost airlines have introduced frequent flyer programs to differentiate themselves from 
competitors and increase customer loyalty in times of increased competition in the market.  
Many firms have experienced that once they had moved away from the cost-leadership 
strategy towards a low-cost strategy, they had difficulties to clearly define their strategic goals 
(Dess and Davis, 1984; Robinson and Pearce, 1986). The lack of clear goals resulted in 
frequent changes to operating models and confusion among owners and managers (Treacy 
and Wiersema, 1995). As a consequence, these firms continue to struggle and perform worse 
than competitors that follow a pure differentiation or niche strategy (Tallon, 2007).  
The question if the application of IS can help low-cost firms improve performance has 
attracted much interest in prior research (Min et al., 1999). It could be argued that IS are 
appropriate to support activities associated with a low-cost strategy, such as standardisation 
and mass production (Melville, 2004). Therefore, one would expect that IS should improve 
the performance of low-cost firms, but actually, early studies found a negative relationship 
between IS and firm performance (Baily, 1986; Roach, 1987; Morrison and Berndt, 1991). 
This phenomenon became known as the productivity paradox of IS (Brynjolfsson, 2003). The 
paradox was mainly resolved during the 1980s and 1990s (Henderson and Sifonis, 1988) 
when researchers started to shift their focus away from the market level and towards the firm 
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level (Devaraj and Kohli, 2003). This shift enabled the consideration of firms’ individual 
circumstances and resulted in a range of studies showing positive relationship between firm 
performance and IS (Melville et al., 2004; Piccoli and Ives, 2005).  
2.2 Strategic Information Systems Planning 
Once the productivity paradox had been resolved, researchers began to examine how firms 
can align IS with their competitive strategies (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1996). The new interest 
in the strategic implications of IS underlined the importance of SISP.  This planning approach 
had already existed before the productivity paradox was resolved, but many firms had 
hesitated to apply it. As empirical evidence seemed to suggest a negative relationship between 
IS and firm performance the purpose in SISP was questioned (Tallon, 2007).  The resolution 
of the productivity paradox triggered practitioners’ interests and made SISP a common 
practice in firms. 
SISP is the process of identifying opportunities to use IS as a means to achieve strategic firm 
goals (Grover and Segars, 2005), and to develop action plans to implement these oppor-
tunities (Newkirk et al., 2003; Segars and Grover, 1998). In the course of the SISP process, a 
firm decides how existing systems can be utilised and which other systems and/or system 
components need to be acquired (Mohdzain and Ward, 2007). The outcome of SISP is an IS 
portfolio that assists a firm to achieve its goals (Lederer and Sethi, 1988). In the early stages 
of the information age, when technology components were expensive and IS were mainly 
used to improve clerical and administrative tasks through batch processing and automation 
(Mohdzain and Ward, 2007), SISP was dominated by the goal to reduce administrative costs 
(Nolan, 1979; Zachman, 1982). Later, when technology costs decreased and new IS 
applications were developed, firms started to investigate how IS could decrease production 
costs and increase efficiencies (Selig, 1982). When finally the positive relation between IS 
and firm performance became evident, SISP goals were extended to increased business 
performance and competitive advantage (King, 1983; Henderson and Sifonis, 1988; Das et al., 
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1991; Earl, 1993; Segars and Grover, 1998; Smits and van der Poel, 1996; Kearns and 
Lederer, 2004).  
Various theoretical approaches to SISP exist (Earl, 1993; Segars and Grover, 1998; Salmela et 
al., 2000) but in this research, we build on Henderson’s and Sifonis’ IS Planning and 
Investment Model (Henderson and Sifonis, 1988) to conceptualise how firms align IS and 
competitive strategy.  The model illustrated in Figure 1 shows how SISP connects the strategy 
of a firm with its IS investments.  The outcome of the SISP process is an investment decision 
that once implemented results in competitive advantage through its alignment with the firm’s 
business strategy (Henderson and Sifonis, 1988).  
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
Henderson’s and Sifonis’ model was chosen as the theoretical foundation of this research 
because in contrast to other SISP models, it is compatible with Porter’s (1985) model of 
competitive strategies through the focus on firm activities.  As mentioned above, Porter 
outlined that firms achieve competitive advantage by selecting activities which correspond 
with the business strategy.  Henderson’s and Sifonis’ model illustrates how a firm’s SISP and 
investment activities are matched with the firm’s business strategy.  Other theoretical models 
on the relationship between SISP and competitive advantage are less adequate because they 
miss this strategy - activity match (Earl, 1993; King, 1983; Segars et al., 1998). 
2.3 Mandatory IS Investments 
Mandatory IS investments are investments which are imposed upon firms by external sources 
such as governmental agencies or powerful customers (Fitzgerald, 1998; Willcocks and 
Lester, 1996).  This research focuses only on mandatory IS investments imposed by 
governmental agencies.  In recent years, more and more government regulations have had 
implications for IS and the pressure to alter IS to achieve regulatory compliance is constantly 
increasing. For example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in 
the US and various information privacy regulations in Canada and the European Union 
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required firms to improve information security standards to avoid data misuse (Matsuura, 
2004). The Basel II capital regulations forced European banks to update database systems to 
prevent data losses (Garcia, 2004). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), a set of auditing 
regulations introduced as a reaction to the Enron bankruptcy scandal in the US, also forced 
firms to improve their IS to ensure high levels of information security (Haworth and Pietron, 
2006). In most cases, firms cannot achieve regulatory compliance through one particular 
investment; rather, several investments are necessary (Garcia, 2004). A mandatory IS 
investment is therefore not a one-time discrete event, it is a series of IS investments that are 
all triggered by a government regulation (Hu et al., 2007).  
In an attempt to reduce costs, firms combine mandatory IS investments with other non-
mandatory investments. For example, Pula et al. (2003) describe how firms use data 
warehouse projects that were originally initiated for purposes other than compliance to 
achieve compliance with anti money-laundering regulations. Further, Hu et al. (2007) report 
how firms combine SOX compliance investments with non-regulatory IS security 
investments.  
Recent surveys show that low-cost firms are increasingly concerned about the high costs 
associated with regulatory compliance (Gartner, 2006). Managers perceive the mandatory part 
of IS investments as an additional cost factor that does not contribute to firm performance and 
threatens competitive advantage (Strassmann, 1996).  The Henderson’s and Sifonis’ IS 
Planning and Investment offers an explanation why mandatory investments are perceived as a 
threat.  According to the model, an IS investment is the result of a three step routine: First, a 
firm defines its business strategy; second, the firm uses SISP to determine necessary IS; and 
third, the firm finally invests (Henderson and Sifonis, 1988). Hence, any IS investment 
decision is the subsequent outcome of the firm’s SISP. Mandatory IS investments disrupt the 
routine described in Henderson’s and Sifonis’ model. As shown in Figure 2, the first two 
steps of the routine are bypassed because the investment is directly triggered by the regulation 
and not by business needs (Ghandforoush et al., 1999). 
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[Insert Figure 2 around here] 
The interruption of the routine described in Henderson’s and Sifonis’ model has an important 
implication: because the investments contains a mandatory part, certain investment 
characteristics are not determined by the firm’s SISP, but rather by government regulations.   
The first characteristic is the mere decision to invest.  Normally, a firm makes an IS 
investment decision based on its business strategy, the carried out SISP activities, and invests 
only if the investment supports the strategy. For example, a firm that follows a low-cost 
strategy can decide not to invest because the investment leads to additional costs that are not 
mitigated by any benefits expected from the investment. In the case of mandatory 
investments, the firm does not have this choice. To ensure compliance, the firm is forced to 
invest regardless of any existing business strategy (Braganza and Franken, 2007).   
The second characteristic is the investment timing. The timing of non-mandatory investments 
is determined by a firm’s strategy. For example, a low-cost firm can decide to postpone 
investments during a time of price wars to be able to further decrease prices. However, in the 
case of mandatory investments, the firm is not completely free to time the investment because 
government regulations define compliance dates, i.e. deadlines for compliance (Haworth and 
Pietron, 2006).  
The third characteristic relates to the implemented technology. The technology required for 
compliance can be different from the technology preferred by the firm. Low-cost firms often 
experience that government regulations require them to implement technology which they 
would otherwise not have adopted in order to save costs (Garcia, 2004).  
The investment characteristics enforced by the regulation make it difficult for firms to use IS 
investments that contain a mandatory part for strategic purposes. Low-cost firms struggle to 
use these investments to reduce costs (Ariff et al., 1997) which is particular problematic 
because these firms are already struggling with shrinking margins (Tallon, 2007). 
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The dominance of government regulations as an investment reason impacts on the 
investment decision, the timing, and the technology implemented.  This impact is 
reduced if other investment reasons emerge. For example, some firms comply with a 
regulation long before the compliance date because they use a non-mandatory 
investment which was already planned before the regulation was enacted to achieve 
compliance. The lower the dominance of government regulations as an investment 
reason, the smaller is the mismatch between investment characteristics and business 
strategy. 
Further insights about multiple reasons behind IS investments can be derived from the 
resource-based view of the firm. The resource-based view proposes that competitive 
advantage is based on heterogeneity, i.e. firms achieve competitive advantage if their 
resources are different from those of competitors (Barney, 1991). As discussed above, if a 
government regulation is the only investment reason it will determine the investment 
characteristics, for example the technology.  In the presence of other reasons such as business 
needs, the technology is not exclusively determined by the regulation; rather, it is influenced 
by the business needs. Hence, the implemented technology will be less similar to the 
technology that competitors implement. According to the resource-based view, this 
heterogeneity of technology results in competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). Based on the 
arguments presented here, it is hypothesised  
(H1) The lower the dominance of government regulations as a reason for IS investments, 
the higher the competitive advantage that low-cost firms gain from these investments. 
2.4 Formal Planning for Mandatory IS Investments 
Surveys among practitioners indicate that most firms apply some form of SISP approach 
(Gartner, 2008b). Prior research distinguishes two major SISP approaches which are termed 
differently in the literature. Following Lederer and Salmela (1996) and McFarlan (1983), we 
refer to these approaches as intuitive and formal because these labels reflect the major foci of 
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the approaches. Intuitive SISP has also been referred to as “non-comprehensive” (Newkirk et 
al., 2003; Sambamurthy et al., 1994), “incremental (Salmela et al, 2000) or “organisational” 
(Earl, 1993). Formal SISP has also been called “comprehensive” (Newkirk et al., 2003; 
Sambamurthy et al., 1994).  
Intuitive SISP mainly relies on personal experiences and judgement of key SISP actors 
(Sambamurthy et al., 1994) who are connected through an informal network (Pyburn, 1983). 
The intuitive approach tends to be very technical because the key actors are IT managers and 
operational IT staff (Ciborra, 1994; Salmela et al., 2000). Managerial staff is rarely involved 
in intuitive SISP and therefore, strategic IS plans are loosely integrated with the firm’s 
business strategy (Sambamurthy et al., 1994). By contrast, formal SISP is characterised by a 
more managerial focus because the key actors are senior general managers (Premkumar and 
King, 1994). Planning decisions are derived from formal SISP methods that enable the 
detailed consideration of strategic options (Ein-Dor and Segev, 1978; Rangunathan and 
Rangunathan, 1991). As a result, IS plans are highly integrated with the firm’s business 
strategy (Premkumar and King, 1994).  
Various studies have examined the benefits and risks of intuitive and formal SISP. Some 
studies argue that the intuitive approach is more flexible and encourages knowledge sharing 
and creativity (Mohdzain and Ward, 2007; Peppard and Ward, 2004) and hence, it is very 
appropriate to develop innovative IS plans (Doherty et al., 1999). Formal SISP tends to 
oversee possibilities that arise from new technologies because technical staff rarely gets 
involved, and managerial staff are often unaware of new technologies (Peppard and Ward, 
2004). Other studies report that formal SISP produces IS plans that are more useful for firms 
because they are closely aligned with the competitive strategy (McFarlan and McKenney, 
1983). Recently, researchers have concluded that there is no general answer to the question if 
firms should follow the intuitive or the formal approach (Philip, 2007).  
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Our conceptualisation of mandatory IS investments as disruptions of the routine illustrated in 
Henderson’s and Sifonis’ model (Figure 3) enables the analysis of which SISP approach is 
appropriate. Firms that follow the intuitive approach (labelled A in Figure 3) will address the 
disruption mainly on the operational level (Sambamurthy et al., 1994).  SISP actors will not 
deliberately attempt to identify possibilities to combine mandatory and non-mandatory 
investments and create competitive advantage because of the loose integration of intuitive 
strategic IS plans with a firm’s competitive strategy (Salmela et al., 2000).  Hence, the firm 
will be mainly unaware of competitive possibilities. The mandatory investment will be 
considered an additional expenditure (Hall and Liedka, 2007) that conflicts with the low-cost 
strategy (Lazarides, 2007). To realign IS investments with the low-cost strategy, the firm 
minimises the expenditures for the mandatory investment, for example by purchasing inex-
pensive technology and minimising planning efforts (Garcia, 2004). Guided by the attempt to 
reduce planning efforts, the firm will not engage in additional SISP activities and will not 
make major adjustments to its existing IS plan. The transition from investments to 
competitive advantage (arrow A.1 in Figure 3) is identical to the original transition in the 
Henderson and Sifonis model. 
[Insert Figure 3 around here] 
By contrast, firms that follow the formal SISP approach will try to closely align the 
mandatory investment with the low-cost strategy (Hu et al., 2007). Therefore, they will 
engage in additional SISP activities to combine mandatory and non-mandatory investments 
and identify opportunities to use IS investment for cost reductions. This approach introduces a 
three-step iteration into Henderson’s and Sifonis’ model. Firms go back to the planning step 
(B.1 in Figure 3), integrate mandatory and non-mandatory investments on a strategic level 
(B.2), and use the combined investment to achieve competitive advantage (B.3). Because the 
formal SISP approach focuses more strongly on strategy than the intuitive approach, firm will 
identify more strategic opportunities. In particular, we expect low-cost firms that frequently 
apply formal SISP will identify more possibilities to combine mandatory and non-mandatory 
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investments. Further, formal SISP will enable low-cost firms to use combined IS investments 
for cost reductions and create competitive advantage.  
The outcome of formal SISP is determined by the formal SISP methods used. Formal 
methods are a central part of the formal SISP approach and the selection of the method effects 
the firm’s strategic IS plan (Salmela et al., 2000). Some firms develop SISP methods in-
house, but this approach is cost-intensive and most low-cost firms avoid it (Lederer and Sethi, 
1988). Prior research and practice have developed a range of standard methods that enable 
firms to efficiently address SISP. Standard methods include business cases (Ward and 
Peppard, 2002), internal contractual arrangements (Feeny and Willcocks, 1998), IT balanced 
scorecards (Teubner, 2007), importance-performance portfolios (Ward and Peppard, 2002), 
information engineering (Lederer and Sethi, 1988), and post-implementation reviews (Piccoli 
and Ives, 2005). These methods vary in characteristics as shown in Table 1 and it is therefore 
possible that formal SISP methods differ in their effects on competitive advantage. Thus, in 
this investigation, we need to distinguish between different SISP methods.  Prior research and 
surveys among practitioners have revealed that the most commonly applied methods are 
business cases, internal contractual arrangements, and post-implementation reviews (Farbey 
et al., 1999; Parr and Shanks, 2000; Sutherland and Remenyi, 1995; Gartner, 2008b) and 
therefore, this research focuses on these three methods. Next, we discuss why these methods 
can be expected to promote competitive advantage in situations where firms are confronted 
with mandatory investments.   
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
Business Cases 
A business case is a formal summary of benefits that a firm anticipates from an IS investment 
(Gil-Garcia et al., 2007; Parr and Shanks, 2000). Furthermore, the business case determines 
necessary actions to put anticipated benefits into practice (Irani et al., 2005). The development 
of a business case includes (1) the systematic identification of technology components created 
through an investment, (2) an analysis of their impacts on the firm, and (3) an investigation 
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into benefits of these impacts (Ward and Peppard, 2002; Farbey et al., 1999). Many impacts 
of new technology are created through synergy effects with existing technology in the firm. 
Developers of business cases therefore need to consider information from all departments to 
fully analyse the impacts of new technology. In an attempt to reduce complexity, business 
cases are represented as a combination of tables, figures and texts (Sarkis and Liles, 1995). 
Figure 4 shows an example of a business case (Ward and Peppard, 2002). 
[Insert Figure 4 around here] 
We argue that the systematic identification of technology components and their impacts will 
enable firms to identify synergies between mandatory and non-mandatory investments and 
hence, it supports the combination of the investments. Low-cost firms will particularly focus 
on cost-related benefits of technology when developing business cases. Thus, firms that 
frequently use business cases to integrate mandatory IS investments with other investments 
will discover opportunities to combine investments so that cost reductions can be achieved. 
Business cases also provide systematic action plans to put IS opportunities into practice 
(Atkinson, 1990). Therefore, firms that develop business cases more often will be more 
successful in implementing opportunities for cost reductions once these opportunities have 
been identified. The implementation of such opportunities results in cost reductions and 
competitive advantage. Hence, it is hypothesised 
(H2a) The more frequently low-cost firms use business cases, the more competitive 
advantage they will create from IS investments that contain a mandatory part. 
Internal Contractual Arrangements 
An internal contractual arrangement is a formal agreement that defines IS-related responsibi-
lities of particular departments in firms (Feeny and Willcocks, 1998). Such responsibilities 
include the systematic identification of IS capabilities and the report of these capabilities to 
the IT department (Figure 5). Internal contractual arrangements are negotiated between each 
department and top management. Their preparation requires detailed information about the IS 
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infrastructure in a particular department (Sutherland and Remenyi, 1995). Firms use the 
arrangements to ensure that previously identified IS opportunities can be successfully 
implemented (Wearne, 1985). The arrangements are particularly useful for the formal SISP 
approach because they facilitate the development of action plans to implement IS 
opportunities.  
[Insert Figure 5 around here] 
Due to the focus on department-specific information, an action plan which includes internal 
contractual arrangements will be of high quality because it will only embrace actions that 
particular departments can realistically be expected to perform. High-quality action plans are 
tremendously important in the context of mandatory investments. Pressured by the externally 
defined timeframes that characterise these investments, senior management might delegate 
tasks to a department that pose great challenges on managers and staff, for example because 
the department lacks necessary resources. The frequent usage of internal contractual 
arrangements for investments that contain a mandatory part avoids such challenges and 
consequently, it contributes to the successful implementation of IS opportunities. As 
discussed before, firms that follow a low-cost strategy will focus on the implementation of 
opportunities which result in cost reductions and competitive advantage. Therefore, it is 
hypothesised 
(H2b) The more frequently low-cost firms use internal contractual arrangements, the more 
competitive advantage they will create from IS investments that contain a mandatory 
part. 
Post-Implementation Reviews 
A post-implementation review is a systematic analysis of potential benefits from past IS 
investments (Smith, 1989). The analysis determines (1) which benefits have not been 
achieved (Piccoli and Ives, 2005) and (2) specifies how missed benefits can still be achieved 
through additional investments. In doing so, the review determines requirements for future 
investments (Figure 6). These future investments are not restricted to the department where 
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the original investment was made; they might also occur in other departments (Doll et al., 
2003). Post-implementation reviews support the formal SISP approach in two ways. First, 
they identify future IS opportunities that arise from previous investment failures (Lin and 
Pervan, 2003). Second, they determine how ‘missed’ benefits can still be achieved through 
further investments. Thus, post-implementation reviews contribute to the development of 
action plans during the SISP process (Brady et al., 2005).  
[Insert Figure 6 around here] 
Post-implementation reviews are important for IS investments that have a mandatory part 
because such investments are usually split into a series of individual investments which are all 
related to a particular government regulation (Hu et al., 2007). This series of investments 
allows firms to re-examine every investment once it has been completed. Firms can evaluate 
if the level of integration between mandatory and non-mandatory investments is appropriate, 
and if any opportunities for cost-reductions have been missed. Based on the outcome of the 
evaluation, firms can make changes to the next investment. For example, a firm can attempt to 
implement a “missed” opportunity for cost reductions in the next investment (Gwillim et al., 
2005). Frequent formal post-implementation reviews facilitate the timely improvement of 
investment decisions. Hence, it is hypothesised  
(H2c) The more frequently low-cost firms use post implementation reviews, the more 
competitive advantage they will create from IS investments that contain a mandatory 
part. 
3 Methodology 
We tested the hypotheses with a secondary dataset provided by the Australian Department of 
Communication, Information Technology, and the Arts (DCITA). In 2004, DCTIA initiated a 
project on IS investments in the July 2003-June 2004 Australian tax year which included a 
survey among Australian IS decision makers. An SPSS dataset containing all survey respon-
ses can be accessed free of charge through the website of the department (DCITA, 2005).  
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3.1 The DCITA Investment Dataset 
The DCITA investment dataset results from a survey that aimed at investigating circum-
stances of IS investments in Australian firms; for example, discovering reasons behind IS 
investments and exploring ways of how IS investments lead to business value and competitive 
advantage. The survey was supervised by the Australian National University (ANU) and 
carried out by a marketing firm. The detailed presentation of the survey is published as a 
DCITA research report (Gregor et al., 2004). In the following, an overview of the survey 
approach is presented.  
The survey comprised three phases. In the first phase, the survey instrument was developed 
adapting survey items from prior literature. Cognitive testing was used to verify the items. 
Cognitive testing is a qualitative validation technique which aims to ensure that all survey 
items are clear to participants and cannot be misunderstood (Goldberg, 1996).  Interviews 
with IT decision makers were conducted to identify potential problems with the items and 
modify the questionnaire accordingly. In the second phase, data was collected through 
telephone interviews. Stratified random sampling was used to split the population into 
homogenous groups and select a representative number of participants from each group 
(Singleton and Straits, 2005); as a result the data is representative for Australian firms. 
Approximately 3,300 firms were contacted and 1,050 usable responses were obtained, the 
response rate was 31 % (Gregor et al., 2004). In the third phase, structured follow-up 
interviews with selected survey participants were conducted. The interviews aimed at 
clarifying any misunderstandings and ambiguous results from the survey. In total, 50 face-to-
face and phone interviews were conducted (Gregor et al., 2004).  
The time of data collection (June-July 2004) coincided with the enactment of the Corporate 
Law Economic Reform Program Act (CLERP 9) in July 2004 in Australia. New auditing 
regulations which were based on the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act were a central part of CLERP 9.  
These regulations were considerably stricter than previous auditing regulations in Australia 
and had various IS implications, including data storage and accessibility regulations (Gwillim 
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et al., 2005). Many firms had to invest in IS to achieve CLERP 9 compliance (O’Leary et al., 
2006). The DCITA survey asked participants about IS investments in the twelve months 
before the enactment of CLERP 9 and hence, it covers investments related to CLERP 9 
compliance. The DCITA investment dataset therefore provides a unique opportunity to 
examine a major change in government regulations and resulting mandatory IS investments in 
Australia. 
In accordance with the focus of this research and to test the hypotheses, only low-cost firms 
that experienced mandatory investments were selected for the analysis. Cases were selected 
using the criteria presented in Table 2. Data was screened for outliers in preparation for 
multiple regression (Hair et al., 2006). Seven out of 149 originally selected cases were 
identified as outliers and removed from the analysis, which is below the critical threshold of 
5% (Wilcox, 2005, p. 228). The final dataset contained 142 cases. 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
3.2 Construct Operationalisation 
The constructs in the hypotheses were operationalised using variables from the DCITA 
investment dataset (Bharadwaj, 2000; Hitt et al., 2002, Dehning and Statopoulos, 2003). We 
found that all constructs in our hypotheses could be measured using the variables in this 
dataset.  
The dominance of government regulations as an investment reason in comparison to other 
reasons was measured following an approach by Sireli et al. (2003). This approach has been 
widely used to measure the dominance of reasons behind actions in prior research (Hitt et al. 
2002; Dehning and Statopoulos 2003). Sireli’s approach calculates a score that indicates how 
important one reason is compared to other reasons. The DCITA dataset contains eight 
variables (ten-point scale) that describe possible reasons behind IS investments (see Table 3), 
with one reason being government regulations.  
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
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To measure competitive advantage from IS investments that contain a mandatory part we 
follow prior studies that suggest that competitive advantage in low-cost firms can best be 
measured through cost reductions (Flynn et al., 1995; Mirani and Lederer, 1998).  The 
DCITA investment dataset contains a set of items that measure different aspects of cost 
reductions achieved through IS investments (Table 4). All items are measured on a ten-point 
scale.  
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
The use of the three SISP methods is captured through single items in the DCITA dataset. 
Each item is measured on a five-point scale. The original questionnaire was reviewed to 
ensure that sufficient information about all three methods (i.e. business cases, contractual 
arrangements, and post-implementation reviews) was provided to the survey participants.  
Thus, we are confident that participants understood the methods in the same way as we do. 
3.3 Control Variables 
We cannot exclude the possibility that IS-based competitive advantage is affected by factors 
that are not expressed in our hypotheses. Therefore, three control variables were introduced in 
the research design: firm size, IS investment volume, and IS experience.  
Firm size was chosen as a control variable because prior studies showed its influence on the 
creation of competitive advantage from IS (Harris and Katz, 1991; Melville et al., 2004). 
Large low-cost firms experience higher competitive advantages due to economics of scale. 
Following Dewar and Dutton (1986), the number of employees was used as a proxy for firm 
size.  
Prior research also showed that the creation of competitive advantage is affected by the 
volume of IS investments (Melville et al., 2004). Large IS investments result in a large variety 
of technology components that provide a wider range of functionality (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 
1996). Therefore, it is possible that large mandatory investments have greater potential for 
cost reductions than small investments. Further, firms with large IS investments might also 
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experience high mandatory investments because they could have more or more complex 
systems than other firms and therefore, they might have to make more adjustments to achieve 
regulatory compliance. As a result, these firms benefit more from formal SISP than other 
firms. We controlled for investment volume to account for these possibilities. 
Competitive advantage is further affected by past IS experience. The time firms use IS and the 
experiences they gain during that time impact their ability to become aware of opportunities 
to use IS for cost reductions (Chang, 2002). Further, firms that are inexperienced with IS 
require more resources to train staff and redesign business processes. Expenditures for 
additional resources might reduce competitive advantage (Melville et al., 2004). To account 
for the effects of IS experience we controlled for the number of years that a firm had used 
computers. 
3.4 Data Analysis and Results 
Our sample includes firms from various industries (see Table 5). IS investment volumes vary 
from below 10,000 AU Dollars to above 20,000,000 AU Dollars and thus, supports the 
importance of controlling for investment volume.  Survey respondents were mainly IT 
managers and general managers. Table 6 provides means and standard deviations for the 
constructs in the hypotheses.   
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
The hypotheses were tested using multiple regression analysis (Agresti and Finlay, 1997) with 
competitive advantage as the dependent variable. Results are displayed in Table 7. The 
standardised regression coefficient of the dominance of government regulations as an 
investment reason is negative and significant and thus, H1 is supported. The coefficients of 
business cases and post-implementation reviews are positive and significant and therefore, 
H2a and H2c are also supported. The coefficient of internal contractual arrangements is not 
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significant and hence, H2b is rejected. None of the control variables became significant in the 
regression analysis. 
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
4 Discussion 
Our analysis shows that the dominance of government regulations as an investment reason 
has a negative effect on competitive advantage.  When IT investments are conducted only to 
comply with government regulations, low-cost firms struggle to achieve cost reductions. 
Furthermore, our analysis shows that two of the investigated formal SISP methods (business 
cases and post-implementation reviews) have a positive effect on competitive advantage 
while the effect of the third method (internal contractual arrangements) is not significant.  
This study provides country-level empirical evidence that practitioners’ concerns about 
mandatory IS investments cannot be completely justified. The surprisingly high score for 
competitive advantage implies that many firms achieve competitive advantage from IS 
investments that contain a mandatory part. We conclude that the high level of competitive 
advantage in our sample results from the comparably low score of the dominance of 
government regulations as an investment reason. The high standard deviation in competitive 
advantage nevertheless suggests that some firms are more successful at exploiting the 
potential of mandatory investments than others. This observation is interesting because low-
cost firms are currently facing price wars and shrinking margins (Tallon, 2007). Our results 
indicate that a government regulation can become a chance of improving market positions. 
Regulations affect a large portion of, if not all, firms in a market. Only some of these firms 
will be able to combine mandatory with non-mandatory investments and reduce costs. The 
competitive advantage achieved by these firms is amplified by the fact that competitors 
struggle to utilise IS investments that contain a mandatory part for cost reductions. Hence, 
these competitors cannot compensate for the additional expenditures associated with the 
investment.  Among all competitors, those with low financial performance will be particularly 
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threatened by mandatory investments because they will have less capital for IS investments 
and therefore, less opportunities to combine mandatory investments with other investments. 
In extreme cases, IS requirements in government regulations can drive struggling firms out of 
the market, especially in markets that are penetrated by low-cost firms and in highly regulated 
industries with frequent changes to government regulations.  
This study further provides insights into the effects of formal SISP methods on IS investments 
that contain a mandatory part. Prior research has demonstrated that formal SISP methods are 
beneficial for firms that operate in unstable environments (Salmela et al., 2000). However, in 
this study only two out of three SISP methods had positive effects. Business cases and post-
implementation reviews enable competitive advantage but internal contractual arrangements 
do not. A possible reason for these results is that the three investigated methods vary in their 
scope of information that is incorporated in the SISP process. Business cases and post-
implementation reviews are developed based on a wide range of information from various 
departments (Lin and Pervan, 2003; Ward and Peppard, 2002). Therefore, in this analysis, we 
refer to them as wide-ranging methods. By contrast, the scope of information used for the 
development of internal contractual arrangements is narrow. These arrangements are based on 
information from one particular department, rather than on information from the entire firm 
(Feeny and Willcocks, 1998). Thus, an internal contractual arrangement can be considered a 
narrow-ranging SISP method. 
Apparently, wide-ranging methods are more adequate than narrow-ranging methods when 
mandatory investments occur. We believe this phenomenon is rooted in the nature of 
competitive advantage in low-cost firms. The strategy of maintaining low costs over a long 
period of time is more effective if cost reductions are planned and implemented across 
departments. Of course, it is possible to restrict cost reductions to particular departments but 
such “local” cost reduction opportunities are limited in most firms (Mata et al., 1995). Firms 
that aim to achieve low costs through cost reductions across all departments have more 
opportunities for savings along their business processes and therefore, firm-wide cost 
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reductions are more effective (Rivard et al., 2006). Narrow-ranging methods fail to identify 
many opportunities because they focus on one particular department. Another argument why 
narrow-ranging methods are inadequate is that government regulations usually affect 
numerous departments simultaneously (Garcia, 2004). Therefore, mandatory investments 
occur in several departments at the same time, resulting in new cross-departmental 
opportunities to combine IS investments and reduce costs. Narrow-ranging SISP methods fail 
to identify these opportunities. 
4.1 Contributions 
This study contributes to theory because it is a further step towards an enhanced under-
standing of mandatory IS investments. Prior research has shown the benefits of formal SISP 
for firms in unstable environments (Salmela et al., 2000), but our findings demonstrate that 
mandatory investments require different planning methods. Thus, our results enhance prior 
knowledge by showing that not all formal SISP methods are equally adequate when 
environmental instability is triggered through changes in government regulations.  Rather, 
firms need to use wide-ranging SISP methods.  
Our study further extends prior research on SISP which mainly distinguished between formal 
and intuitive SISP. Our results indicate that this differentiation might not completely explain 
SISP outcomes. We found that two groups of formal SISP methods exist, wide-ranging and 
narrow-ranging methods. These groups lead to different outcomes of mandatory IS 
investments in low-cost firms. 
The findings of this study have implications for managers of low-cost firms who are con-
fronted with mandatory IS investments. Managers need to recognise that firm survival can 
depend on the ability to combine mandatory and non-mandatory investments. They need to 
carefully observe the regulatory environment to forecast mandatory IS investments and 
identify options to combine investments.  
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Furthermore, managers need to choose appropriate planning methods for mandatory 
investments. Surveys among practitioners have shown that managers in low-cost firms tend to 
avoid formal planning methods in an attempt to minimise planning resources (Garcia, 2004). 
We recommend that selecting an appropriate planning method can be a more profitable tactic. 
Through the application of wide-ranging SISP methods like business cases and post-
implementation reviews low-cost firms can combine mandatory and non-mandatory 
investments in such a way that competitive advantage is achieved. Finally, our study also has 
implications for public policy makers.  Awareness should exist that regulatory changes and 
new legislation can lead to an unexpected consolidation effect on markets because of the need 
to invest in IS.  
4.2 Limitations 
Although confident that we developed sound hypotheses and utilised an adequate approach to 
test them, we acknowledge that our study design has several limitations that arise from the 
usage of a secondary dataset. Prior research on IS investments has successfully used 
secondary datasets before (Hitt et al., 2002), and it has been demonstrated that these datasets 
can provide reliable and valid results if the challenges associated with such datasets are 
addressed appropriately (Bharadwaj, 2002). In the following, we outline which challenges 
were identified in this study and how they were addressed. First, it was not possible to directly 
ensure internal validity because we were not involved in the original data collection 
(Singleton and Straits, 2005). To address this challenge, we carefully studied the data collec-
tion process and believe we found sufficient evidence (e.g. cognitive testing and interviews) 
to assume internal validity. Second, the usage of a secondary dataset also bore the challenge 
of using variables in a different way than it was intended by the researchers who collected the 
data. Again, we carefully studied the report about the development and testing of the 
questionnaire and came to the conclusion that we understood all variables in the intended 
way.  
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The fact that the DCITA survey was supported by a governmental agency might have resulted 
in a response bias.  For example, participants might have been influenced by their political 
view or by the hope to gain governmental support for participation. Our research design did 
not allow us to account for this bias but we believe this influence is limited because the data 
was collected through a third party (i.e. marking firm).  
5 Conclusion 
Costs arising from mandatory IS investments are of increasing concern, particularly in low-
cost firms.  Our study investigated how low-cost firms can still benefit from mandatory 
investments.  Utilising the Henderson and Sifonis Planning and Investment Model, it was 
proposed that firms achieve competitive advantage if they combine mandatory and non-
mandatory investments, and use formal SISP methods.  
Our empirical analysis confirmed that the combination of investments results in increased 
competitive advantage.  Nevertheless, not all formal SISP methods promote competitive 
advantage; rather, firms need to apply wide-ranging formal methods like business cases and 
post-implementation reviews when planning mandatory IS investments. 
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Figure 1 
Information Systems Planning and Investment Model 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Mandatory Investments in Information Systems  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
Intuitive and formal SISP for combined mandatory and non-mandatory Information System 
Investments 
 
 34 
Figure 4 
Illustration of a Business Case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
Internal Contractual Arrangement for Reporting of Information Systems Needs and 
Capabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
Post-Implementation Review 
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Table 1 
Overview of formal SISP methods 
 
 
 
Formal Planning 
Methods Key SISP Actors Planning Techniques Scope of Information used References 
Business Case • Business managers • Project managers  
• Cost-Benefit Analysis 
• Quantification of tangible benefits  
• Qualitative estimation of tangible 
and intangible benefits  
• Roadmaps  
• Information from all departments and 
business processes 
• Information about present and future 
company goals and strategies 
Atkinson, 1990; Irani et 
al., 2005; Farbey et al., 
1999Sarkis and Liles, 
1995; Ward and Peppard, 
2002 
Internal 
Contractual 
Arrangement 
• Business manager 
• Department manager  
• Service Agreements 
• Report cards for contract 
negotiation and monitoring  
Information from particular departments   
Wearne, 1985; Feeny and 
Willcocks, 1998; Suther-
land and Remenyi, 1995  
Post-Implemen-
tation Review 
• Project managers 
• Business managers 
• Users 
Project success evaluation using pre-
defined and post-defined success 
measurements 
• Information from the reviewed project 
• Information from interrelated projects 
• Context information from the entire firm 
Lin and Pervan, 2003; 
Brady et al., 2005 
IT Balanced 
Scorecard 
• Top management 
• Functional managers 
• IT managers 
• Analysts 
Cost monitoring based on 
quantitative business metrics 
• IS information from varies departments 
• Customer information 
• Business process information 
• HR information 
• Finance information 
Teubner, 2007 
Importance-
Performance 
Portfolios 
Process planners Quantitative or semi-quantitative evaluation of process performance 
• Information about one particular IS-
supported business process 
• Context information from the entire firm 
Ward and Peppard, 2002, 
pp. 225-226 
Information 
Engineering 
• Managers 
• Business analysts  
• Conceptual modelling techniques 
• Analysis of enterprise models, data 
models, process models 
• Information from varies departments 
• Structural information about the firm 
• Business process information 
Lederer and Sethi, 1988 
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Table 2 
DCITA dataset variables for case selection 
 
Selection 
Variable Item in Questionnaire Scale Selection 
Occurrence of 
Mandatory IS 
Investments 
Please indicate how important the following 
reason was for your IS investments in the past 
12 months:    
- Changes to regulatory and other 
government requirements 
1: Extremely 
unimportant 
… 
10: Extremely 
important 
Cases >5 were 
selected 
Competitive 
Strategy 
‘Does your organisation compete on the price 
of products and services?’ yes/no 
‘yes’ –cases 
were selected 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Calculation of the dominance of government regulations (DRG) as an investment 
reason 
 
Measurement Items and Equation  
Measurement 
items  
Please indicate how important the following reason was for your IS investments in 
the past 12 months:  
GOV Changes to regulatory and other government requirements 
COM Keeping up with competitors
FOR Being forced to invest by trading partners such as suppliers 
CUS Customer expectations 
COA Establishing or enhancing competitive advantage 
OPP Taking advantage of an unplanned opportunity 
COS Reducing Costs 
EFF Gaining Efficiencies
Equation  
 
                                               GOV                                        
DGR1 = ------------------------------------------------------------- 
              GOV+COM+FOR+CUS+COA+OPP+COS+EFF 
 
1 Score was calculated for each case in the dataset 
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Table 4 
Question in the DCITA dataset used to measure competitive advantage 
 
Measurement Items  
SCM Savings in the supply chain 
OPE Reducing operating costs 
COM Reducing communication costs 
WOR Avoiding the need to increase the workforce 
ROA Increasing the return on financial assets 
PRO Enhancing employee productivity 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Sample demographics 
 
Sample of 142 firms by 
Industry N Number of Employees N 
IS Investment Volume 
past 12 Months N Respondent N 
Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing 11 0-19 0 < $ 10,000 8 Owner 14 
Manufacturing 9 20-50 61 $ 10,001 -         $ 20,000 9 
General 
Manager 26 
Electricity, Gas and 
Water 7 51-200 40 
$ 20,001 -         $ 
100,000 31 IT Manager 76 
Construction 12 >200 41 $ 100,001 -       $ 200,000 19 Other 26 
Trade 24 
 
$ 200,001 -       $ 
1,000,000 13 
 
Transportation and 
Storage 8 
$ 1,000,001-       $ 
2,000,000 9 
Tourism and Cultural 
Services 14 
$ 2,000,001-     $ 
10,000,000 11 
Communication 11 $ 10,000,001-   $ 20,000,000 7 
Government 
Services 2 >$ 20,000,000 10 
Finance and 
Business Services 30 missing 25 
Education 7 
 
Healthcare 7 
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Table 6 
Descriptive statistics of the constructs 
 
Construct Scale Mean S.D. 
Dominance of Government Regulations
as an Investment Reason 
0 ... 1 = higher score indicates higher 
dominance 0.14 .03 
Frequency of using Business Cases 
1 ... 5 =  higher score indicates higher 
frequency of usage  
3.17 1.39 
Frequency of using  
Internal Contractual Arrangements 3.17 1.36 
Frequency of using  
Post-Implementation Reviews 3.40 1.39 
Competitive Advantage 1 ... 10 = higher score indicates higher level of competitive advantage 6.72 1.52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7  
Results of the multiple regression analysis 
 
Hypothesis Independent Variable 
Standardised Beta  
(Dependent Variable: 
Competitive Advantage) 
H1 Dominance of Government Regulations as an Investment Reason -0.21** 
H2a Frequency of using Business Cases 0.20* 
H2b Frequency of using Internal Contractual Arrangements -0.01 
H2c Frequency of using Post-Implementation Reviews 0.27** 
Control 
Variables 
Number of full-time Employees -0.13 
Investment Volume -0.14 
Years of Computer Usage 0.09 
R2 = 0.27      adjusted R2 = 0.23               * p < 0.05        ** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
